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HOW WILL THE PROPOSED EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT AFFECT LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES?
CHRISTOPHER STEWART
University of Rhode Island
The Employee Free Choice Act was one of
the most highly publicized issues during the
2008 presidential election. This proposed
legislation, if enacted, would profoundly change
current labor law in the United States. The
legislation consists of three sections that
represent an overall policy of facilitating union
organizing, and by consequence, collective
bargaining. The three sections provide for
streamlined union certification, guaranteed first
contracts for newly certified unions, and
increased penalties for employer misconduct
during the process. Given the current sentiment
in the United States toward unions, CEOs, and
the prevailing economic uncertainty, there is no
shortage of opinions on this proposed
legislation. Consequently, an analysis of the
legislation with special consideration of
potential unintended impacts is in order.
WAGNER ACT HISTORY
The legislation that the Employee Free
Choice Act (EFCA) is proposed to alter is the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) also
known as the Wagner Act. In analyzing the
EFCA, it is helpful to consider the origins of the
NLRA. The failed predecessor of that legislation
was President Franklin Roosevelt's National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1934, which
was part of the new deal. That legislation had a
number of provisions aimed at spurring
economic recovery, including a provision for
collective bargaining between employers and
employees. Specifically, section 7(a) of that
legislation mandated employers provide
employees “...the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing...free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers.” Labor leaders hailed
this as a Magna Carta for organized labor
(Rosenzweig & Lichtenstein, 2008). An
onslaught of organizing ensued with the battle

cry, “The president wants you to join a union.”
This was the impression President Roosevelt had
given working America when he stated, “If I
worked in a factory, I'd join a union.” The NIRA
eventually failed as it had no provision for
enforcement and it was ultimately determined to
be unconstitutional in the United States Supreme
Court Case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
The NIRA gave way to the Wagner Act of
1935. Crafted by the Senator whose name it
bears, and his advisor, Leon Keyserling, this
legislation granted employees the rights to
organize, bargain collectively, and engage in
concerted activity. Though it is clear that is what
the act was specifically intended to do, the
question is why was it deemed important to do
it? There are numerous theories. Kaufman, in his
comprehensive work, Why the Wagner Act?
indicates, “...the fundamental point behind the
Wagner Act [is] that unions are to be
encouraged precisely because they do raise
wages (Kaufman, 1996).” Kaufman goes on to
indicate that remarks made by Keyserling, the
chief architect of the Wagner Act, indicate that it
was part of a coordinated macroeconomic
program intended to combat the depression
through two related means: stabilization of the
wage-price structure and promotion of consumer
purchasing power.
Gross, in analyzing what he refers to as
conflicting statutory purposes of the NLRA,
interprets statements from the same source, Leon
Keyserling, with more of an industrial justice
theme. He advances the position that the act was
designed to, “make the worker a free man
(Gross, 1985). He concludes that, “[Wagner]
considered the advancement of economic and
social justice, rather than the reduction of
industrial strife, to be the primary objective of
the Wagner Act (Gross, 1985)”
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It is worth noting that these two scholars,
after extensive research of the same sources of
material, have come to somewhat different
conclusions as to what the real original intent of
this legislation was. Additionally, their
summations are different from the purpose of the
act implied in its own policy statement; “It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions...”
In considering of the Wagner Act, it seems
that its true purpose can be grouped into four
possible categories:
1. Balance of employer/employee power,
2. Facilitating employee domination,
3. Facilitating employer domination, or
4. Overall positive macroeconomic impact.
Regardless of the underlying motivation, the
intent of the act is clear. Senator Wagner and
President Roosevelt, possibly for different
reasons, wanted workers to form unions, and
bargain collectively with employers.
In that respect, the Wagner Act had the
desired effect. It began a period of
unprecedented
unionization,
and
by
consequence, collective bargaining. Union
membership and density effectively doubled in
the three year period after the bill was enacted
(Troy, 1985). Additionally, the United States
experienced the economic recovery that may
have been the underlying purpose of the act. To
what extent that outcome is attributable to the
Wagner Act is debatable as the recovery was
proximate in time to not only the act, but also
other new deal legislation, economic policy, as
well as turmoil in Europe.
The Wagner Act was modified in 1947 with
the Taft-Hartley Amendments, otherwise known
as the Labor-Management Relations Act. These
amendments put limitations on some of the
successes the unions had enjoyed as a result of
the passage of the Wagner Act. Certain practices
by unions that were seen as inappropriately
usurping control of companies were eliminated.
Most notable, in light of considering the
Employee Free Choice Act, these amendments
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eliminated previous restrictions on employers
openly contesting unions' organization attempts.
Additionally, the new legislation provided for
unfair labor practices by unions and a process
for their decertification. The Taft-Hartley
Amendments and the Wagner Act have been
combined with other legislation to form what is
today's National Labor Relations Act. The act
provides for the establishment of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as its primary
enforcement agency.
DECLINE OF UNIONS
In analyzing labor statistics furnished by the
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics, it is evident that there has been a
steady decline in union rates since the 1950’s.
There are many theories on why this is the case,
but little consensus. Explanations tend to fall
into one of two broad categories. First,
decreased union rates have been caused by
economic factors. “Labor economists typically
stress economic explanations, which vary from
compositional shifts in the job structure due to
increased competition both domestically and
internationally (Wachter, 2007).” Along these
lines, globalization has been blamed for the
decline in union membership by causing a
decline in demand for union jobs. Additionally,
the shift in the United States to a service based
economy has contributed to this effect.
Manufacturing jobs have been off-shored. These
are the industries that were traditionally heavily
unionized. These jobs disappeared and were
largely replaced with service sector jobs. Jobs in
this sector traditionally are not strongly
unionized.
The other category that is attributed with
causing union decline is legal in nature. “Labor
law commentators naturally focus on labor law
explanations, such as the difficulty of controlling
management opposition to unions” (Wachter,
2007). Examples of this sort of management
opposition are intimidation of employees for
union activity, termination of employees
attempting to organize unions, interfering with
the union certification process, and refusing to
bargain with a union.
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This is the perspective that his given rise to
the EFCA. It is these alleged patterns of
behavior that employers have engaged in that the
new
legislation
specifically
addresses.
Proponents of this school of thought believe that
the way to address the problem is to adjust the
existing law.
ORGANIZATION AND ELECTION
PROCESS

Current Process
Years of case law from federal courts as
well as the National Labor Relations Board,
have put into effect the current system of union
recognition that the EFCA seeks to alter. Under
the current statute there are three ways for a
union to form. They all essentially begin in the
same manner. The associated group of interested
employees and/or non employee organizers will
embark on a campaign to form a union. In doing
so, the fabled union recognition cards are
distributed to the employees who are to be
included in the new union. A “card count” of
the recognition cards that are signed and
returned ensues. The cards are required have
language indicating that the signer authorizes the
union to bargain for them in reference to wages,
hours, and working conditions, or that he is
requesting an election to certify the union.
The card count is an attempt to show, by
cards signed by employees, that there are
grounds to recognize the union as the bargaining
agent for the concerned employees. If the union
can demonstrate this, and convince the employer
to recognize the card count, they can then assert
themselves as the bargaining unit. Having been
recognized by the employer, the union then
would file a petition to the NLRB for
certification as the employee's sole agent for
bargaining.
According to the United States Supreme
Court Case, NLRB vs. Gissel, authorization
cards were found to not be inherently unreliable,
but employers are not acting in bad faith by
refusing to recognize the union on the basis of
them. Consequently, if the union organizers
have demonstrated over 30% employee interest
through recognition cards, the employer is
within its right to force an election. This is the
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second way a union can achieve employer
recognition and NLRB certification. The union
would file a petition with the NLRB for a
“Certification of Representative” election. The
employer then has to respond to the NLRB and
file either a consent to the election, which
provides for the NLRB regional director to settle
any objections, or a stipulation, which allows
ultimately for judicial remedy to any objections.
The election is then scheduled, and the
employer has seven days to forward a list of
names and addresses of the employees to be
represented by the union to the NLRB. The
election ideally commences in approximately
four to six weeks.
The NLRB sends out notices of the election
to the employers, which are to be posted. The
NLRB will then, on the assigned date, conduct
the election. This is done in the presence of
representatives from both sides. In order to win
the election, the union must only obtain the
majority of ballots cast by employees who
actually vote. If they lose, they have to wait ten
months to start another organization campaign,
and one year to attempt another election. In any
case, if either side has an objection to the
election results, they must go on record within
five working days.
The final way a union can be certified by the
NLRB occurs when an employer has embarked
on a pattern of behavior that is so egregious
against the union as to make a fair election
impossible. In such cases it is within the power
of the NLRB to certify the union in question
against any objection offered by the offending
employer. The employer is compelled to bargain
by the NLRB's issuance of what is sometimes
called a “Gissel Order.” This name is derived
from the previously cited Supreme Court case
which provides for such an order.
Upon NLRB certification of the union, the
employer is compelled by law to engage in
collective bargaining under section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA. Failure to do so is characterized as an
unfair labor practice. Committing such an act
will result in penalties against the employer.
The penalties for unfair labor practices are
set out in the legislation. They are modest by
anyone’s estimates, consisting solely of a NLRB
issued order to bargain. This results in criticism
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of the current law's ability to ensure that
employers abide by the requirements of the
NLRA in terms of not inappropriately
interfering
in
organization
campaigns,
certification elections, and collective bargaining.
It's these points that the EFCA seeks to alter
presumably to the benefit of workers: Streamline
the certification process so that the choice of an
election is in the hands of the union, Forcing the
parties to interest arbitration where a first
contract cannot be achieved, and increasing
penalties where the employer commits unfair
labor practices. Thus begins the examination of
the EFCA.

Section 1 of EFCA
The first section of the new legislation
relates to how union certification elections are
administered by the NLRA. This is a major
alteration of a process that has been in effect
since the genesis of the Wagner Act in 1935. It
is described in section two of the EFCA entitled,
Streamlining Union Certification. That is exactly
what the legislation's language provides for.
As indicated in the previous section, a card
showing of 30% or more of the members of the
intended union will entitle them to a NLRB
administered certification election. Under the
new legislation, this will not change. What the
new legislation does is add a provision
mandating NLRB certification in any case where
the union in question can demonstrate interest by
a majority of the employees. This is done by
obtaining signed recognition cards from 50 % of
the employees plus one. This is indicated by
proponents of EFCA as the primary major
benefit of the legislation (United States
Congress, 2007). It is important to note the
distinction that in an election under current law,
it is only the majority of those who actually
show up to vote that is necessary for a
certification. Under an EFCA card check
certification, it is necessary for a majority of the
entire potential union membership to authorize
the union as its bargaining agent.
In reference to this, it is important to
remember that under the current legislation,
unions almost never request a certification
election with as few as 30 % of the potential
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union members signing cards (Bronfenbrenner,
1994; Ferguson, 2008). Organizers refer to what
is called the “15% drop” in reference to the
amount of cards they think they need to produce
to have a reasonable chance at a successful
election. That is, if they hold 30 % of cards, they
would expect to only receive 15 % of the vote in
a certification election where they have to
capture 50 % plus 1 of the votes cast for a
victory. Consequently, organizers indicate that
they will hold out for 70 % or more of cards
before considering an election. The implication
is that elections do not occur as often as may
have been intended under the original NLRA
legislation.
By allowing for union recognition with a
showing of 50 % plus 1, the election process is
bypassed. It is this aspect of the legislation that
provides for the biggest battleground over the
EFCA. EFCA proponents assert that the election
process has been so subverted by business
interests, NLRB members and employees with
anti-union or pro business agendas, that a valid
and fair election is a near impossibility. By
contrast, EFCA opponents point to peer pressure
and coercive tactics used by unions and union
sympathetic employees to pressure other
employees to sign recognition cards, and
consequently interfere with their First
Amendment right of free association.

Management Tactics EFCA Attempts to
Address
Undeniably, management has the capacity to
profoundly affect the ability of a union to
organize in their workplace. Management
opposition in one form or another has been
found to be a key determinant of NLRB election
outcomes. Many believe that increased
opposition has been a major cause of the
precipitous fall in private sector union density
over the past two decades (Freeman & Kleiner,
1990).
Further
findings
indicate
that
“...management opposition, reflected particularly
in the actions of supervisors, is a key component
in union inability to organize workers in the
United States” (Freeman & Kleiner, 1990)
The importance of these findings is revealed
when one considers the potential impact of
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EFCA on attempts, legitimate or otherwise, by
employers to interfere with unionization
campaigns. Freeman and Kleiner conducted a
study of the use of management tactics and their
effects surveys of both employers and
organizers. “Supervisory opposition is the most
important management action to deter
unionization” (Freeman & Kleiner, 1990). The
effects of supervisory opposition on union
campaign success are magnified when they are
able to protract the certification process.
It is the tactics that these managers use that
fuel the debate for the necessity and
appropriateness of the EFCA. The Taft-Hartley
Amendments afforded employers rights for
making a case, during an organization drive,
against unionization. Specifically, it is provided
that, “The expressing of any views, argument or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.”
Prior to that, any interference was
punishable under section 8 of the NLRA as an
unfair labor practice. In the post Taft-Hartley
period, employers are able to enjoy almost
unrestricted access to employees for the purpose
of campaigning against the union. When doing
so, the distinction between threats and
“predictions” of adverse consequences can
become a legal battleground causing a damaging
delay to the organizing campaign (Drummonds,
2007).
Specific tactics include such things as
mandating employees attend captive audience
and supervisor “one on one” meetings. Also,
employers retain lawyers and consultants to
advise them on how to thwart unionization.
Proponents of EFCA argue that this unrestricted
access to employees during working hours
constitutes an unfair advantage. In contrast, non
employee union organizers are afforded limited
access to workers at the workplace under United
States Supreme Court case law (Lechmere Inc.
v. NLRB). In addition, restrictions are placed on
employee organizer's activities when on the
employer's property.
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This speaks to the inherent conflict between
workers’ rights afforded by the NLRA and
employers’ property rights under common law.
Opponents of EFCA might discount arguments
that employers are afforded an unfair advantage,
indicating that the use of mandatory meetings
and consultants are a logical counter campaign
to the unions' organizing efforts. That however,
does not account for the notion that the original
Wagner Act never intended to make this process
fair. There is the position that the purpose of that
legislation was to give the employees the
advantage in the union organizing campaign to
counter the disproportionate power of the
employer, who controls the workplace (Gross,
1985).
Employers' use of captive audience meetings
and consultants is legal and would be
characterized by EFCA proponents as less
egregious attacks on organizing. Other, more
egregious tactics are said to be employed with
devastating effect. One of the most devastating
tactics that has been used by employers to avoid
unionization has been termination of employee
organizers. Part of the problem with the existing
legislation that has allowed this phenomenon is
the modest penalties associated with it. If an
employer employs this tactic, he could typically
remove the employee organizer's influence and
enthusiasm from the process, thus injuring the
election. This would have the added effect of
intimidating other employees.
The NLRB does not have accurate statistics
on the number of employees terminated for these
reasons, as many cases are settled prior to
adjudication. However, the NLRB annual report
for fiscal year 2007 does indicate that “alleged
illegal discharge or other discrimination against
employees was the second largest category [of
unfair labor practice brought] against employers,
comprising 6853 charges, in about 45.6 % of the
total charges” (NLRB Annual Report FY2007).
Additionally, the annual report indicates that
the NLRB awarded back pay of $117.3 million
dollars for the year (id.). One has to keep in
mind that these back pay awards may be multi
year awards. Considering these factors, it seems
very likely that employers are using these
terminations to some extent to illegally influence
the certification process. In some findings it is
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estimated that, “over the current decade, illegal
firings have marred over one-in-four NLRBsponsored union elections, reaching 30 % of
elections in 2007” (Schmitt & Zipperer, 2009).”
Yet in a opposing view presented by the
Center for Union Facts, it is indicated that the
impact of illegal terminations on the process is
less dramatic. In analyzing the associated statics,
that finding is that, “ ...a maximum of 3.75 % of
union organization campaigns included an
unlawful termination.” and, “ ...the number of
employees fired during elections is insignificant
(Wilson, 2009). In those findings, it is indicated
that 158 cases for fiscal year 2007 did not have a
significant impact on the unionization process.
However, this opinion does not account for how
this action impacts and intimidates employees
other than those who are terminated. Also
consider that in four back pay cases decided in
September 2007, the discriminatory acts
occurred in 1999,1996,1990, and 1997-an
average of 11 years ago (Drummonds, 2007).
One would have to consider what impact this
had on fellow employees.
Additional employer actions alleged to have
a profound impact on union success rates are
any tactics that prolong the election process.
One in particular is objecting to some aspect of
the election so as to cause delay. The longer the
employer can do this, the more time they can
take advantage of their access to employees to
perpetuate their position against unionization.
These delays have a severe impact. In her study,
Kate Bronfenbrenner illustrated that when this
occurs, success rates fell from 47% to 23 %
(Bronfenbrenner, 1994). EFCA proponents
would indicate that this is an unfair manipulation
of the system, and injecting delay in the process
interferes with the intent of the NLRA.
Opponents would pose that it is a legitimate
tactic not precluded by law.

Elimination of Procedural Delay
By altering the legislation, the EFCA's
authors are creating a system where the
employer can no longer compel the union in
question to a NLRA sponsored election to
achieve certification. With the elimination of the
election process, the authors are eliminating the
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period between the recognition petition, card
count, and the election. This is the time during
which employers are able to conduct their
counter campaigns. Consequently, this is the
time where most of the employer abuses are
likely to occur. By minimizing this time,
organizers will be subjected to less of the
employer's tactics cited above.
Of concern to EFCA opponents is that union
organizers would be able to conduct “blitz”
campaigns. That is, they would potentially be
able to organize and be certified as the
bargaining agents by the NLRB before the
employer has a chance to react. While this
would minimize the employers ability to commit
unfair labor practices, it would also prevent
them from exercising rights to assert their
position on unionization that they have been
granted under the existing legislation and
associated case law. The new legislation seeks to
mitigate employer unfair labor practices in
exchange for usurping the employers First
Amendment right to mount a legal campaign
against an organizing attempt. Employers are
within their rights to hire consultants and mount
an anti union campaign as long as it is not based
on threats or coercion.
The specter of the “blitz” campaign is not as
grievous a tool as EFCA opponents may think it
is. In fact, the argument has been made
previously in the NLRB v. Gissel decision that
organizers could mount the secret campaign on
the basis of cards, circumventing the rights
given to employers under the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. The convening Supreme Court
indicated that this would be an unlikely
occurrence. This is due to the fact that
organizers would lose very important protections
afforded them under the NLRA by doing this. If
the employer is not aware that an organizing
campaign is underway, that employer cannot be
found to have committed an unfair labor
practice. Consequently, in many, if not most
cases, organizers would make a clear and
unambiguous notice to the employer that a
campaign is underway to achieve those
protections.
Organizers would have to decide if they
would risk forgoing the NLRA protections in
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favor of a secret campaign. The advantage here
would be to eliminate the negative effect of the
employer's anti-union campaign. If the
organizers efforts could truly be kept secret, they
would clearly have the advantage because the
employer would not be aware of a reason to
commit any of the unfair labor practices
associated with an organizing campaign.

Organizer Coercion
Critics of the EFCA indicate a belief that
employee and organizer peer pressure and
coercion to sign recognition cards will become
routine. It is unknown to what level this will
have an effect. Indeed it is alleged that this is
occurring now under existing legislation. Much
of the congressional testimony on the EFCA
alleges that this is currently the case
(Congressional Report 110-4). Testimony was
given as to how organizers would harass and
coerce prospective union members for the
purpose of having them sign interest cards.
Many witnesses indicated that they signed the
cards in an effort to get the organizers to leave.
Additionally the National Right to Work
Committee indicates that this is a rampant
practice in union organizing (Facts & Issues,
2009). As with the congressional testimony, the
evidence presented to justify this is anecdotal.
There is a decided absence of hard statistical
data on such events from an unbiased source.
In reference to misrepresentation, similar
events are alluded to. “ There is extensive
evidence of signatures on cards being solicited
based on claims the cards are requests for
information or a “showing of interest” so a
meeting can be held or pizza bought for
employees, or for the union organizer to show
“my boss I'm doing my job,” or even as lottery
tickets.”(Seaton & Rusham, 2009)
Again these issues are not new, and were
addressed by the US Supreme Court in Gissel. In
that ruling, the court indicated that “...the same
pressures are likely to be present in an
election.(NLRB
v.
Gissel)”
The
misrepresentation as to the intent of the cards
was also addressed at that time. Employers
asserting the same concern were advised that the
NLRB's Cumberland Shoe Doctrine dictates
“...if the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states
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on its face that the signer authorizes the union to
represent the employee for collective bargaining
purposes and not to seek an election), it will be
counted unless it is proved that the employee
was told that the card was to be used solely for
the purpose of obtaining an election.(id.)”
Here the distinction between single purpose
and dual purpose cards becomes important.
Currently, single purpose cards would typically
indicate that the signatory authorizes the
indicated union to bargain on their behalf. The
issue here is that this card, under current
legislation would likely result in an election.
Also, a single purposes card might indicate that
the employee in question wants an election. A
dual purpose card would contain language to
cover both contingencies.
Clearly, the current system lends to abuses
by organizers in the form of misrepresentation or
coercion. It is not known to what extent. It
follows logically that by passing EFCA, the
stakes of a card campaign are increased. As
such, one would expect a greater rate of
misconduct on the part of organizers, and a spike
in these events as the amount of organizing
campaigns increases. These sorts of events can
be addresses under the existing legislation as
union unfair labor practices.

Can the EFCA Fix these Problems?
All of these potential or actual abuses aside,
the debate over the card check clause of the
EFCA can be reduced to a very simple formula.
Do employees want to be in unions? If so, do
they currently have a reasonable access to
unionization? If not, would this provision of the
EFCA remedy that? An analysis of existing data
provided by the NLRA and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics may give a simple picture of what, if
anything should be done to facilitate greater
access to unionization and by consequence,
collective bargaining.
It is not disputed that since the high point of
unionization in the United States, that union
rates and membership numbers have been in
steady decline. Current membership rate for
private sector employees in unions is 7.6%
(NLRB Annual Report FY2007). This puts the
rate at pre-Wagner act levels. As we have seen,
the different camps have different opinions as to
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why this is the case. Essentially, EFCA
proponents would make the case that this
condition is caused by a combination of
inadequate legislation, and abuses perpetrated by
employers. EFCA opponents would indicate that
this decline is driven by employee preference,
abuses committed by unions with an agenda to
perpetuate themselves through the collection of
dues, and globalization. Also put forth is the
position that, ...”[Organized labor] is simply not
as important as it once was, because the
government has an alphabet soup of agencies
dedicated to protecting the rights of American
workers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
OSHA and the Family and Medical Leave Act
make the need for unions far less
acute(Goldberg, 2009).” So the first question is
to try to establish to what degree the average
worker in United States private industry wants
access to unionization and collective bargaining.
The
Worker
Representation
and
Participation Survey (WRPS) was a yearlong
study that began in 1994. It was directed by
Richard Freeman of Harvard University and Joel
Rogers of the University of Wisconsin. The
purpose of that study was, “...to provide an indepth survey of employee attitudes toward
current work organization and human resource
practices and toward different forms of
workplace participation and representation
(Freeman & Rogers, 1999).” To that ends a 26
minute telephone survey was conducted with
2408 employees participating. The key to the
survey was, “Three big questions and their
answers (id.):” Do employees want greater
participation and representation at their
workplaces than is currently provided? What do
employees see as essential to attaining their
desired level of participation and representation?
What solutions do employees favor to resolve
any
gap
between
their
desired
participation/representation and what they
currently have?
In the data collected from the answers to
these questions, the WPRS indicates that most
American employees want more involvement
and greater say in their jobs. The majority would
favor a workplace organization to provide them
with group as well as individual voice.

8

Interestingly, the majority of workers polled
indicated that they would prefer to attempt this
through “joint consultive committee's” with a
“sizable minority” wanting a union or union like
organization (id.).
The findings indicate that at least the
majority of those polled indicated that they
wanted to enjoy benefits associated with
collective bargaining; they would prefer to
achieve them without having to join a union.
The survey further indicates that the benefits that
workers are looking to secure are not just
monetary. They are looking for greater voice
and input in the workplace and the ability to
choose their own representatives to achieve this.
In 2007, Richard Freeman conducted an
analysis of his original WRPS results alongside
some more current indicators of possible interest
in unionization. His analysis incorporated data
from polls conducted by Peter D. Hart Research
Associates from 1993 through 1995 (AFL-CIO
Labor Day Survey, 2005). The question of
interest for Freeman was one asked of non-union
workers. Specifically, they were asked if they
would vote for or against a union. The key
finding in this regard, as indicated by Freeman,
is “ In 2002 the proportion of workers who said
they would vote for a union rose above the
proportion that said they would vote against a
union for the first time in any national survey: a
majority of nonunion workers now desire union
representation in their workplace (Freeman,
2007).” According to Freeman this indicates an
increased desire for unions among workers with
an ultimate goal of achieving a reduction in the
“gap” between participation and representation
in the workplace.
However, like every aspect of the EFCA,
there are dissenting studies indicating that the
American workforce has a different desire than
that asserted by Freeman. Zogby International
concluded a similar study in 2006. Their
telephone survey asked of nonunion households,
“If an election were held tomorrow to decide
whether your workplace would be unionized or
not, do you think you would vote [for or against]
a union (Zogby, 2006)? Ultimately they report
35% of respondents voting for with a clear
majority of 58% voting against. The conclusion
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of that survey, and another conducted the
previous year is that, “Most American workers
seem more inclined to view organized labor as
something that may benefit their neighbors, but
is not necessarily a benefit to them personally
(Peck, 2005).”
The issue of whether or not American
workers want to be unions is further complicated
by a recent Gallup poll. Conducted March 1415, 2009, the poll asked respondents, “Generally
speaking, would you favor or oppose a new law
that would make it easier for labor unions to
organize workers?” Their results indicate 53%
of those surveyed as being in favor of such a law
while 39% would oppose that law. The balance
of 8% tendered no opinion. Gallup indicates a
belief that the crisis of the current economy,
along with corporate bailouts and the bonus
scandal, has fostered an environment of
increased sympathy for working people and
unions. Consequently, they postulate that the
time is right for proponents of the EFCA to win
passage of the law in the House and Senate
(Saad, 2009).
There seems to be a possible indication of
increased interest by employees to organize into
unions. Therefore, the next question would be;
do they have reasonable assess to unions? An
analysis of data from the NLRB's annual report
would give an indication as to what degree of
success employees are having at organizing
under the existing legislation. This question
becomes very complicated because of the
number of variables involved. An initial analysis
of the NLRB data initially implies that unions
are doing quite well when it comes to
certification elections. Over the past ten years,
unions have won certification in just under half
of the election staged, and maintain a positive
net increase in union members (NLRB Annual
Report FY2007). This, on its face, would imply
a fair and equitable system in the certification
process. However, this analysis omits a number
of important factors. The long term trend has
been for a steady decline in union density (an
expression of the percent of the labor force in
unions), overall numbers of union members, and
the number of elections. Over the past ten years
alone there has been over 200 elections per year
reduction in the number of elections held. This
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gives credibility to the arguments that employer
interference is taking its toll on the process;
fewer employees are willing to submit to the
process, and the fact that organizers wait until
they have a super majority of recognition cards
before they initiate an election. At best, the
question of whether employees are getting the
appropriate access to organizing and elections is
inconclusive without a more detailed analysis
consisting of analyzing the available statistics
along with actually interviewing the stake
holders.
Additionally, these statistics are not fully
indicative of the state of collective bargaining in
the United States. For Fiscal years 1996 to 2004,
the FMCS helped settle an average of
approximately 250 first contracts per year. Cases
where an employer voluntarily recognized a
union and reached a first contract without FMCS
assistance are not tracked by the FMCS or
NLRB. Consequently, there is some collective
bargaining taking place in the workplace beyond
the detection of the federal government (United
States Cong., 2007).
For the sake of analysis, we can conclude
that employees are not be afforded the access
that was initially envisioned by the authors of
the Wagner Act. Consequently, the next phase of
the analysis is in order. The question becomes
will this section of the EFCA facilitate more
unionization, and consequently, more collective
bargaining?
Logic would indicate that this would be the
case. By all accounts, this legislation would
remove many of the legal, and illegal tactics
employers might employ to thwart the
organizing process. Not only would the increase
be due to effectively streamlining the existing
process, but also from the likely increased
amount of organizing campaigns that will result.
Events studied in Canada give some
indication of what effect the EFCA will have on
organizing campaigns and their success. Prior to
1977, all ten Canadian provinces allowed for
card check recognition. The union in question
would be certified as the bargaining agent if the
number of cards they had met a certain
threshold. This was from 50% to 55% depending
on the province in question (United States
Cong., 2007). In that year, five provinces
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adopted new systems requiring mandatory
voting consisting of a secret ballot election.
Subsequent studies comparing union success
rates for the two systems were conducted. First,
a broad study of nine provinces was conducted.
Compiling data from those nine provinces over
the period from 1978 to 1996 revealed findings
that are not surprising. A success rate nine points
higher was realized by card check over secret
ballot elections.
Additionally, a more specific study was
conducted in reference to organizing success in
the Canadian province of British Columbia. That
province allowed union recognition until 1984.
From 1984 to 1993, they defaulted to a system
of requiring a secret ballot election. Again
results are consistent with most expectations.
During an eleven year period where card checks
were allowed, the union success rate was 91%.
The success rate drops to 73% for those years
where secret ballot voting was mandatory. The
other effect that was realized where the card
check system was used was more attempts at
unionization. During the period where card
checks were allowed, the average number of
attempts was 531. Where secret ballot voting
was mandatory, the amount of attempts dropped
to an average of 242 (United States Cong.,
2007).
Finally, an increased success rate for union
certification should result from the mitigation of
delay in the process. The streamlined, short
duration process will create a condition that will
allow for diminished efforts on the part of
employers to thwart certification. All of the
above factors considered together seem to
bestow organizers with an opportunity for
increased and more effective organizing
campaigns. In this regard, the EFCA seems to be
able to deliver what its authors intended.

Other Considerations
Consider that under the current system, there
must be at least a 30% showing, through cards,
that the entire prospective union members are
interested in certifying the union. Then, the
employer can compel an election where a simple
majority of those who show up to vote will
result in a union certification. In the new system,
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there must be a showing of interest, via cards, by
a simple majority of the entire unit. It is the case
now that most organizers will attempt to get
significantly more than half of the unit to sign
cards. Many prospective union members may be
signing cards in an effort to appease a pushy
organizer. Under the new system it would be
incumbent upon these employees to be more
sincere in their indications of union interest on
the cards. Even if organizers mislead them about
the purposes of the cards, without a doubt, an
employer would make it known that signing the
card will result in a union certification.
Employees will be held more responsible for
signing these cards. As with most contracts in
the United States, signing these cards would
become a binding issue.
EFCA proponents have taken pains to
indicate that EFCA will not eliminate the
certification election. It is their assertion that the
legislation simply takes that choice away from
the employer. The employees will have the right
to call an election. The idea is that if there is a
segment of the prospective union members that
do not want affiliation with the union in
question, they would be able to request an
election from the NLRB to not have the union
certified. However the problem is that this is not
expressly provided for under the EFCA. There is
no procedure for how this would work. The
disinterested employees would seemingly have
to show disinterest in the form of a card count.
Having done that, they could petition the NLRB
for the election. The problem for them would be
at the point the new unit was certified through
the simple majority card count, they would be
granted protections against decertification.
Specifically, they would be barred from
decertifying that unit for a period of one year.
This is not the same as simply shifting the right
to call an election from the employer to the
employees.
The employee organizers would not be
likely to petition for such an election either. This
is because of the 15 % drop phenomenon. If they
have 50 % plus one of the cards, by these
projections, they will not win the election. They
have no incentive to petition for the election. If
they have a guarantee of immediate recognition ,
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unions will never choose the election (Seaton &
Ruhsam, 2009).
ARBITRATION

Current Process
After a union is certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent for employees, its position is
not without peril. The real test of how effective
this attempt at management and labor
cooperation will be is the negotiating of the first
collective bargaining agreement. It is this
agreement that is the blueprint for how the
company and employees will interact during
future operations. This document will grant and
guarantee the compensation levels of the
involved employees. Even more importantly, the
agreement sets the rules for how much say the
employees will have in how the workplace
functions. To this degree, it is the document
where the company effectively surrenders a
portion of their management prerogative. As
such, they tend to be very deliberate in how they
proceed toward this collective bargaining
agreement.
Under the current law, an employer is
required by section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA to
bargain with a certified union. The employer and
union are required to bargain on wages, hours
and working conditions. Failure by either party
to negotiate on these grounds constitutes an
unfair labor practice. These unfair labor
practices are commonly referred to as failure to
bargain, refusal to bargain, and bargaining in
bad faith. These infractions are punishable under
the NLRA; however, this punishment generally
consists solely of an order to submit to
bargaining. Only in the past few years has the
NLRB taken a more forceful stance on these
failures to bargaining. This policy for attempting
to add additional remedies has its origins in the
NLRB's Office of the General Counsel. The
General Counsel is independent from the Board
and is responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of unfair labor practice cases and for
the general supervision of the NLRB field
offices in the processing of cases.
The current General Counsel, Ronald
Meisburg, has indicated a belief that when bad
faith bargaining has occurred, merely ordering

11

the parties to bargain may not return the parties
to the “status quo ante (Meisburg, 2007).”
Additional measures are advocated, such as
seeking an extension of the certification year,
allowing union access to bulletin boards,
mandating periodic reports on the status of
bargaining, and reimbursement of bargaining
and litigation expenses by the employer. It is
advocated that these remedies be sought in cases
involving first contracts, as the union is at that
point, still in a tenuous position in regards to its
longevity. Although this is the position of the
General Counsel, the Board itself seldom adds
these provisions, saving them for the most
egregious cases.
While it is stipulated that unions, as well as
employers, engage in bad faith bargaining,
clearly the General Counsel's statements on the
matter indicate that it is more commonly
committed by the employer. A brief analysis of
the numbers of failure to bargain cases for FY
2007 gives a view of this. 8178 cases of
employer failure to bargain were alleged for FY
2007. The number for unions was 290. By the
NLRBs own estimates, approximately 49% of
these are initial contract cases. Additionally,
where initial contracts are concerned, about 28%
of these refusal to bargain cases are found to
have merit. Consequently, it can be estimated
that approximately 1120 of these refusal to
bargain cases effect initial contracts and have
merit.
An analysis was conducted of data obtained
from 118 cases where newly certified unions
were seeking first contracts. In this study it is
demonstrated, as with the organizing drive, that
employer efforts at delaying the process will
result in a decreased likelihood of an agreement.
“It was shown that the NLRB delays in
resolving employer objections and challenges to
election results, and employer's refusal to
bargain in good faith, and discrimination
subsequent to election victories all substantially
reduce the probability of agreement (Cooke,
1985).” Again, the issue of delay in current
NLRB procedures is one of the driving forces
behind proponents’ insistence on the EFCA's
section on forced arbitration.
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Management Tactics EFCA Attempts to
Address

of discovering how willing the offending party
seemed to be towards coming to an agreement.

Generally, there are several tactics that
employers are alleged to use in effort to refuse to
bargain with a newly established union. The
most obvious is the outright refusal to bargain.
This is a basic refusal to even acknowledge to
existence of a bargaining relationship. The
employer indicates a belief that the union,
despite being certified, has no authority to
bargain for the employees, and/or the employer
has no duty to bargain with the union.
Additionally, one of the parties might
simply refuse to meet at reasonable times, or
make unmanageable requests or demands as to
how the process should be conducted, in an
attempt to frustrate the process. Assigning
bargaining agents who do not have sufficient
authority is also a tactic used by both employers
and unions. Employers may refuse to provide
information necessary to the bargaining process,
such as financial information that they are
required to provide by case law. All of these
issues would be referred to by the NLRB as
refusal to bargain in good faith.
Another common tactic employed by both
employers and unions is “surface bargaining.”
This is when one or both parties meet for the
purpose of bargaining. Instead of intending to
make a good faith effort of coming to an
agreement, the party that is engaging in surface
bargaining merely goes through the motions of
the bargaining process. They make no real
attempt to come to any agreement on the
disputed issue or issues. It is important to
remember that there is a distinction between this
and “hard bargaining.” Hard bargaining is the
right of both parties to reserve a strong position
on an issue.
Ultimately standards of good faith and bad
faith have been defined through federal court
and NLRB decisions. The consideration that
must be met to prove bad faith is the totality of
the conduct involved. Consequently, it is rare for
the NLRB to make a determination of bad faith
bargaining on the basis of one event. An
investigation is generally conducted to the ends

Forced Arbitration
The second section of the Employee Free
Choice Act is entitled, “Facilitating Initial
Collective Bargaining Agreements.” What this
section does is essentially compel the parties not
only to the bargaining process, but also to the
actual agreement. Specifically, this section
provides for new recourse to establish a timely
collective bargaining agreement. If after a period
of ninety days from certification, the parties
have not come to an agreement; either party can
file for mediation and conciliation with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. If
an agreement is not resolved at that level, the
FMCS, upon request of one of the parties, is to
refer the matter to interest arbitration with the
end result being a collective bargaining
agreement to be in force for two years.
It is this part of the legislation which is the
most radical departure from the existing
provisions of the NLRA. The existing law has
sought to facilitate a process. It does so with
generally no power or inclination to force an
agreement. Once the parties have agreed to, or
been compelled to bargain, they are free to use
any legal means at their disposal to condition a
collective bargaining agreement on favorable
terms. The parties are free to use persuasion and
economic pressure in the form of strikes or
lockouts to achieve their ends.
As with the election and recognition
process, there are strong indications of employer
and union misconduct during the negotiation of
the first contract. The current system lends itself
to this type of abuse by the very fact that the
NLRA does not compel the parties to agree. The
parties are only required to bargain. The
requirement to bargain is specified in section
8(d) of the NLRA. Specifically, collective
bargaining is defined as the parties’ requirement,
“...to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.” It is
the vagueness of these terms that allows for the
process to be confounded.
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Initial contract negotiations are often more
difficult than established successor contracts
negotiations, since they frequently follow
contentious representation election campaigns
(Meisburg, 2006). It is reported that in
approximately 32% of the cases where
employees do gain union representation, they are
unable to achieve a first contract (Broderdorf,
2008). It is undeniable that this has to do with
the parties taking inappropriate advantage of the
weakness of the current legislation. Again, the
spotlight seems to be on employers. According
the Ronald Meisburg, “...our records indicate
that the initial period after election and
certification, charges alleging that employers
have refused to bargain are meritorious in more
than a quarter of all newly certified units (28%).
Moreover, of all charges alleging employer
refusals to bargain, almost half occur in initial
contract
bargaining
situations
(49.65%)
(Meisburg, 2006).”
This is a larger problem because at this stage
of events, the union is still not produced a solid
foundation. The NLRA allows for a period of
protection for the union of one year to establish
its first collective bargaining agreement. If after
the expiration of this certification bar period, the
union does not have an agreement in place, the
union is susceptible to decertification. It would
not be unlikely that newly unionized employees
would have become disenchanted with the
union, having failed to achieve its goals.
Consequently, they would be naturally less
inclined to continue to advocate for the union,
and may seek decertification or replacement by
another union.
The question becomes is it appropriate to
make such a radical departure from what has
been the system provided for by the NLRA, and
solidified in the rulings of the NLRB and
various courts. That tradition has been to
facilitate a process of bargaining. The NLRB
and courts have been very careful to not cross
over the boundary of the process to actually
force any side to accept terms of an agreement.
Indeed, it was held by the United States
Supreme Court that, “..the [NLRB] does have
the power under the National Labor Relations
Act... to require employers and employees to
negotiate, it is without power to compel a
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company or a union to agree to any substantive
contractual provision of a collective bargaining
agreement (H.K. Porter Co. Inc. v. NLRB, 1970)
The parties have essentially been protected
in their rights to hard bargaining. One such way
this has been done is the courts handling of cases
of “Boulwarism.” This is simply another name
for last, best offer bargaining. The namesake for
which was the Vice President of Labor Relations
at General electric. “The employer's idea here is
that a tortured process of give and take in which
the employer is excoriated for its obstinacy and
unreasonableness and gradually brought down to
a modified position only enhances the prestige
of the union and diminishes that of the employer
(Gould, 2004).” This is not equated to bad faith
bargaining because good faith bargaining does
not require the parties to make proposals and
counter proposals; it merely requires a good
faith intent to consummate an agreement. A
similar tactic that has also been constructively
condoned is regressive bargaining. This is a
system where one party indicates that a rejection
of the proposed agreement by the other party
will result in the first party's submission of a less
attractive offer. The courts and the NLRB have
indicated that neither of these tactics,
individually, would substantiate a claim of bad
faith bargaining. Though considered with other
factors, they might support such a claim.

The Right to not Agree
The primary objections by opponents of the
EFCA regarding arbitration do not originate
from the agreement itself. The concerns are that
this process will inappropriately influence the
content of these agreements.
The EFCA section on mandatory arbitration
would eliminate an important benefit that
employers have enjoyed under the existing
legislation. There has been an acknowledgement
of the rights of the parties to not reach an
agreement. In Chevron Oil V. NLRB, the court
held that, “...If the insistence is genuinely and
sincerely held, if it is not mere window dressing,
it may be maintained forever though it produces
a stalemate. Deep conviction firmly held and
from which no withdrawal will be made, may be
more than the traditional opening gambit of a
labor controversy. It may be both the right of the
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citizen and essential to our economic system...of
free collective bargaining. The Government,
through the [NLRB], may not subject the parties
to direction either by compulsory arbitration or
the more subtle means of determining that the
position is inherently unreasonable, or unfair, or
impracticable, or unsound.” The parties, having
bargained in good faith, may be unable to reach
an agreement on one or several issues. That
having happened, the parties are said to have
reached an impasse. Upon reaching an impasse,
the employer is free to put into action provisions
or an agreement that is consistent with their last,
best offer to the employees. The employees are
then free to put economic pressure on the
employer to achieve an agreement they find
more favorable.
This section of the EFCA proposes the most
dramatic change to the representation and
bargaining process of the EFCA. Again, it is a
radical departure from the current process. The
NLRB decisions and federal case law have
established a system where power and economic
force are essentially the mechanisms which
compel agreement with the NLRA merely
guaranteeing that the process takes place. The
EFCA proposes to eliminate this and force
agreements on the parties. Consequently, there
are strong arguments against adopting such a
system.

Constitutionality of Forced Arbitration
The first argument in reference to this
section of EFCA is that it is too vague. This is
certainly a compelling position. The wording of
the clause requires the parties submit to FMCS
sponsored mediation and arbitration when they
are unable to achieve a first collective
bargaining agreement. It further tasks the FMCS
with the burden of creating a system to facilitate
this. It provides no guidelines or requirements as
to how this is to be accomplished. Opponents of
the EFCA find this disturbing as this is a fairly
complicated process that creates an agreement
that both parties will be subject to for a period of
two years. It has been suggested that this would
be an unconstitutional delegation of authority by
congress.
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Article 1, Section1, of the constitution vests
“all legislative powers herein granted...in a
Congress of the United States.” According to
the Supreme Court, this “...text permits no
delegation of [legislative] powers” and Congress
must, at a minimum, “lay down by legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to act is directed to
conform.” It is suggested that this is the case
with EFCA. As congress has asked the FMCS
to create specific standards for arbitral awards
without providing any “intelligible principle” to
guide the agency. Congress has provided no
structure regarding the complicated and
important matter of arbitral standards
(Broderdorf, 2008).

The EFCA fails to provide such
guidance or set forth an intelligible
principle. The EFCA language simply states;
“The service shall refer the dispute to an
arbitration board established in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed
by the service.” It directs the FMCS to
compose an arbitration board but does not
expressly provide whether the FMCS should
merely develop the procedural aspects of
convening a board or whether it should develop
substantive rules on the board’s decision-making
power. Furthermore, it fails to constrain the
FMCS’ rule-making authority. For all of these
reasons, it is possible that the interest arbitration
provision in the current version of the EFCA
would not survive constitutional scrutiny.
Essentially, the opinion is that congress is
delegating too much authority to the FMCS
without a specific guiding principle. This
principle would be necessary to for the
substantive and procedural guidelines of the new
process.
Clearly the authors of the EFCA intended
this section to upset the power balance that
occurs
in
first
contract
negotiations.
Traditionally, this power has been held by the
employer. It is the employer that controls the
workplace, and the compensation. Forcing this
arbitration is a mechanism to force the employer
to surrender control in the form of management
prerogative from the workplace. The intent is to
try to level the playing field as the indication
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from the NLRB's General Counsel is that the
system is inappropriately out of balance.
Another objection to the arbitration clause of
the EFCA is put forth on the basis of potentially
violating the constitution. The position is that
the arbitration mandated by the act is an affront
to the eminent domain section of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. Essentially, it is
posited that the current legislation compels the
parties to bargain, but they retain their right to
not agree, and walk away. As stated, the EFCA
would force the parties to arbitration at this
point. This would result in the government,
through the FMCS, forcing an agreement where
the employer is likely to make concessions for
which it will not receive a reasonable return on
capital (Epstein, 2008). This imposing costs on
one party to provide non reciprocal benefits to
others is a per se violation of the takings clause.
This position makes a number of
assumptions. First, should the parties proceed to
FMCS forced arbitration; the agreement would
be disproportionately in favor of the union. With
no parameters included in the legislation for the
FMCS to follow, this is an assumption not based
in fact. Agreements could possibly favor
employers, or simply set a sparse general
framework for the parties to negotiate from at
the expiration of the two year initial contract. In
a purely economic analysis, it may be the case
that the employer will be forced to pay increased
compensation, but would possibly gain
increased cooperation and productivity from
workers.
Proponents of this position have attempted
to apply this logic to other forms of government
mandated social welfare. These include
minimum wage laws, unemployment, and
employer's mandatory contributions to Social
Security and Medicare (Gottesman, 2009).
These conventions are accepted parts of
American society. They have not been
successful challenged as an affront to the
constitution, nor are they likely to be. That being
the case, it seems unlikely that should the EFCA
pass, it would be successfully attacked on this
issue.
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Unintended Impacts
While this change may level the playing
field to the benefit of unions, the possible
negative effects on the process have to be
considered. By forcing arbitration, the EFCA
may cause bargaining behavior on the part of the
parties that was not intended. The primary
determinate of this will be if the parties in
question think they are likely to get a better deal
by negotiating, mediating, or arbitrating.
The view of opponents is that while the
NLRA's original purpose was to facilitate
collective bargaining relationships, this section
of the EFCA would actually have the opposite
effect. Two conditions are alluded to which are
essentially two sides of the same issue. First is
that unions, believing that the FMCS will
provide a middle ground agreement, will make
outrageous demands for their first contract. They
would essentially attempt to gain an
unreasonably favorable agreement with the
worst outcome being a fair agreement compelled
by the FMCS. Conversely, to avoid arbitration,
employers may concede to agreements that are
less than fair to them to avoid the uncertainty of
arbitration (Filipini & Kopolovich, 2009).
Again, this argument presumes a position
that the FMCS developed arbitration system
would disproportionately benefit the unions.
There is little indication that this is the case.
However, the concept that the parties may not be
as motivated to reach a bargained agreement is
valid. This has been previously studied, and is
commonly referred to as the “narcotic effect.”
This is when interest arbitration creates
dependency and weans employers and unions
away from real collective bargaining (Singh &
Dannin, 2006).
Though this phenomenon has been studied,
there are contrary findings. The narcotic effect
has been analyzed in the public sector
bargaining venue, as that is where interest
arbitration is most prevalent. In analyzing this
effect in the public sector, the reliance on
interest arbitration has two effects. The first was
documented in 1978. It consisted of an analysis
of police and fire submission to arbitration in the
wake of a law the mandated interest arbitration
after impasse. In that study, the unions and
employers was analyzed over a period of several
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successive bargaining periods and agreements. It
was determined that there is a “definite pattern
of re-usage (a [positive] narcotic effect) (Chelius
& Extejt, 1985).” Essentially, the finding was
that unions and employers who had resorted to
interest arbitration in previous bargaining rounds
were prone to resort to it again. However, this
was only significant for the first three
agreements.
This data was analyzed three times by
different authors: Butler & Ehrnberg in 1981,
Kochan and Baderschneider in 1978, and
Chelius and Martin in 1985. Thought they did
use the same data, different methodology was
employed. In spite of this, the authors all came
to the same results. The narcotic effect was
prevalent early in the bargaining relationships.
In those cases where the party had deferred to
arbitration in the past, they were likely to do so
again. However, this pattern only occurred early
in the relationship. As the bargaining
relationship matured, this effect was diminished.
The tendency was away from deferral to
arbitration and consequently to a bargaining
agreement. Ultimately, it was asserted that, “The
concern frequently expressed over the positive
narcotic effect therefore appears to be
exaggerated, if not groundless (Chelius & Extejt,
1985).
The implication is that parties in a mature
bargaining relationship are motivated to avoid
interest arbitration. This could be for a number
of reasons. Hopefully, the parties are realistic
and flexible in their negotiations. It could also be
that the experience of submitting to interest
arbitration is unsavory for the parties. This is
because they are effectively surrendering control
of the process to a disinterested party. The fear
and uncertainty of having to accept a
unfavorable agreement may be enough to
motivate the parties to avoid the process
altogether. Finally, it may be the case that the
arbitration process itself is expensive, and the
parties are inclined to avoid having to pay it.
Essentially, the narcotic effect seems to be
localized to early in the relationship. This may
have serious implications for the EFCA
arbitration clause, since agreements bargained as
a result of it will all be from an immature
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relationship. In light of the research, how the
parties will react cannot be definitely predicted.
There is a strong indication to support the
position of opponents of EFCA that unions will
be susceptible to the narcotic effect. Again, this
presumes that the FMCS would craft a system
that disproportionately rewards unions for
pushing bargaining to the point of mandated
arbitration. If the FMCS determined policies
disproportionately benefit the employers, it may
be they who submit to the narcotic effect.
Unions and employers will have to take their
cues from the decisions that are made prior to
their own situations. It will be incumbent on the
FMCS to craft a fair and equitable system. This
system must also be effective in dissuading the
parties from applying for arbitration, thus
facilitating bargaining. FMCS appointed
arbitrators will have to work within this system
to render decisions that will make the parties
doubt a guaranteed positive outcome to the
arbitration, and consequently have a healthy fear
of this uncertainty.
Again, this assumes that the US Congress, in
passing the EFCA, still intends for collective
bargaining to be the primary way of attempting
to ensure labor stability. There may be a dual
message contained in this section of the
legislation. First, the EFCA is designed to
encourage bargaining by only facilitating a first,
two year contract. The parties will need to
bargain for the successive ones. However, the
legislation allows either party to file for
arbitration after a period of approximately four
months after union certification. This is an
extremely abbreviated period as opposed to the
one year certification bar period that the
currently legislation allows for. Granted, it may
be Congress' position that that period is too long.
As previously stated, there is another side to
the narcotic effect. EFCA opponents insist that
employers who are bargaining in good faith will
be punished. Consider that 68% of new unions
do achieve first contracts. If this is the case,
there are obvious impacts on those employers
who are bargaining in good faith. As stated
above, they are put under increased pressure to
formulate an agreement before the matter is
forwarded to the FMCS for mediation and
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arbitration. The assumption is that employers,
being traditionally in the position of power, will
achieve less favorable agreements than they
would were there no deadlines.
EFCA opponents also make the position that
of the remaining 32% of cases where a first
contract is not achieved, only a positron of these
employers are bargaining in bad faith. The
balance are likely engaged in “hard bargaining”
from a position of economic superiority. Again,
the idea is put forward that they will be forced
by the FMCS to accept an agreement less
favorable than they could have achieved
otherwise (Brodedorf, 2008).
This position discounts the mediation
portion of the process. It could be argued that
when the matter is brought to mediation, the
mediator would make a determination that the
employer's position is realistic based on their
level of power in the equation. Further, should
the matter proceed to arbitration, it cannot be
assumed that the arbitrator will act solely to the
benefit of the employee. It may very likely be
the case that the arbitrator will defer to a
reasonable position of an employer who has
submitted to the entire bargaining process in
good faith.
A suggestion is made by Broderdorf to
revise this section of the EFCA. As stated above,
it is his position that forced arbitration is
essentially an unjust punishment to employers
who have shown a tradition of good faith
throughout the bargaining process with the new
union. In an effort to make this a more fair
aspect of the act, the authors should consider
changing the EFCA so that a finding of bad faith
is necessary before a new contract can be
referred to FMCS for arbitration. This does seem
to be a vary fair way of eliminating what might
be a shortcoming of the EFCA. The problem
with it is that injects another possibility of delay
into the process. The NLRB would have to make
a determination of bad faith bargaining. This
process would undoubted protract the matter,
and thus not solve the problems that caused the
proposal of the EFCA in the first place.
PENALTY
The last section of the EFCA is the one that
has gotten the least attention, and caused the
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least amount of controversy. This section is
entitled, “Strengthening Enforcement,” as that is
exactly what it does. For years critics have put
forth the opinion that the NLRA did little by
way of deterring illegal employer interference in
organizing activity. The act itself laid out what
was inappropriate, illegal conduct, but offered
no significant penalty for that conduct.

Rethinking the Make Whole Approach
Authors of the new legislation have sought
to remedy this, by all accounts, biggest
shortcoming of the NLRA. As was stated in
reference to section one of the act, the amount of
employer interference in organizing does have a
noticeable effect on it. Specifically, the
documented tactic of termination of union
activists employees in not uncommon, and is
very effective. The current ramification for this
is simply to reinstate the wrongfully terminated
employee with back pay minus earnings.
Specifically, the employee is restored to his
position. He or she is then issued the money they
would have been paid for the duration of the
termination. This is referred to as a “make
whole” approach. The employer gets to subtract
from this amount what the employee earned at
alternate employment during this period.
Generally, this is not considered to be significant
enough to deter offending employers from using
this devastating tactic. It is believed that anti
union consultants have advised employers to use
this tactic. Little documentary evidence is
available to reference this as the consultant
would be advising the employer to engage in
illegal activity.
Increased penalties for this have been
advocated for years. Robert Reich, US Secretary
of Labor during the Clinton administration
asserts, “We tried to penalize employers who
broke the law, but the fines are minuscule,” and
“The most important feature of the Employee
Free Choice Act...toughens penalties against
companies that violate their workers' rights
(Reich, 2009).” Leonard Page served as General
Counsel for the NLRB from November 1999 to
April 2001. In his criticism of the current
process, he stated, “...the NLRA has not been
fulfilling its intended purpose of protecting
workers' section 7 rights for at least the last forty
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years...the essential problem is delay and
ineffective remedies (Page, 2005).” Page
suggests additional damages against offending
employers in the form of lost equity in property
such as houses and cars in wrongful termination
cases. These types of damages are routinely
sought under other statutes and are clearly
consistent with the “make whole” approach (id.).

Triple Back Pay
The EFCA's authors have sought to make
this sort of activity more costly to employers.
This part of the legislation is simple enough. The
illegal termination of an employee by his
employer for union activity would result in the
employee being reinstated with back pay, and
additionally, twice that amount as liquidated
damages. The sole purpose of this measure is to
make the prospect of interfering with union
organizing by terminating employees too
expensive a prospect. The authors of the EFCA
further add to the deterrent value of this section.
The have added a provision for an employer to
be subject to a civil penalty for willfully and
repeatedly committing unfair labor practices
during organizing campaigns and first contract
bargaining attempts. This penalty of up to
$20,000 per occurrence would be in addition to
any make whole remedies ordered by the board.
Again, the purpose of this section is to
dissuade employers from a certain course of
action. That is terminating employee organizers
and interfering in the organizing and first
bargaining process in other inappropriate
manners. By consequence, this could eliminate
the delay associated with protracted proceedings
on this matter. As previously stated, a delay in
these processes works to the benefit of the
employers. The delay causes the union
momentum to lose speed, and the participants to
lose interest. Where in the other sections, the
EFCA attempts to streamline the process to
eliminate delay, this section attempts to
eliminate the cause of the delay.
This section of the EFCA receives the least
criticism from opponents. This is because it
would be hard for even the most management
oriented observer to decry these measures. If one
believes that these violations are occurring to
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any degree, it would be very difficult to support
a position that the current penalties are
appropriate for so overt a violation of the law. If
one believes that these infractions are not
significant, then the magnitude of the penalties
would not be an issue, as they have no bearing
on the process. Since it has been demonstrated
that these complaints are made to the NLRB,
and a significant percentage are found to have
merit, the former position is the most likely.

No Penalties for Unions
That is not to imply that there is no criticism
for this section of the EFCA. In regards to this,
the following observation has been made: “At
the same time, the EFCA does not provide for
any increased penalties or remedies against a
union that commits unfair labor practices against
the employees or the employer. While
proponents claim that the EFCA is meant to
protect employees from intimidation or
harassment in their representation choice, it fails
to provide an increased deterrent against union
authorization card abuses despite the heightened
significance placed on cards (Filipini &
Kopolovich, 2009).” This argument reverts to
the position that the NLRA and the EFCA are
intended to extend rights, benefits, and penalties
equally to the members of the bargaining
relationship. It discounts the position that those
laws are in fact designed to level the playing
field where the employer will almost always
have a decided advantage and a pronounced
position of power.
Still this position may not be without merit
if the agenda is to streamline the process, and
mitigate delay. A cause of this delay is
misconduct on the part of both parties resulting
in unfair labor practices. It would seem prudent
to perhaps dissuade unions from engaging in
inappropriate activities that may result in
proceedings that protract the process. Of specific
concern is the new organizing, or card check
system. The anecdotal evidence does indicate
that some abuse in the form of misinformation
and coercion is occurring. To what level this
occurs is debatable. What is likely though is that
if the system is modified in such a way that
increased inappropriate activity can occur, it will
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likely occur. As organizers are put under
pressure to successfully organize, some will
respond to this pressure by engaging in
inappropriate activity to achieve the outcome
that is expected.
The addition of penalties for this may be
appropriate in the case of non employee
organizers. Their parent organizations could be
sanctioned in some manner. The problem would
be for employee organizers. If these organizers
were subject to such allegations, and penalties
were attached, this could be perverted into
another system used to thwart union organizing
attempts. False allegation against employees and
organizers could intimidate them into
abandoning their campaign, and frustrate the
entire process with more proceedings resulting
in more delays. Any attempts at crafting
legislation in regards to penalties to unions and
organizers needs to be very carefully considered
and worded.

Unintended Impact
While these penalties will certainly offer a
deterrent value to some employers, it will not
likely be consistent throughout the country. The
structure of the penalties under the EFCA is
regressive in that it will have a greater impact on
companies with less capital available. The civil
penalties allow for adjustment up to the sum of
$20,000 for each occurrence. However, the
“make whole” remedy mandates the award of
triple back pay, with the added amount
representing damages to the employee. There is
no discretion provided for to adjust this amount
based on the employers’ ability to pay. More
financially stable employers will realize a lower
deterrent value than ones less so under this
structure, as they would be better able to weather
the impact of having the wrongful termination
allegation sustained.
There will doubtlessly be other impacts on
these types of unfair labor practices. The
question of the increased penalty's impact on the
NLRB's adjudication of these matters needs to
be considered. Will the increased penalties result
in a higher standard of proof being sought to
sustain such a case. Under the current
legislation, the board can sustain the allegation
of an unfair labor practice if it is shown to have
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occurred by a “preponderance of the evidence
(NLRA Section10(c)).” This is a lower standard
of proof applied by courts under common law.
Its meaning is that the event is more likely to
have occurred than not. In a more quantitative
explanation, there would be 51% or more
indication by the evidence that the event has
occurred. This is a very subjective standard.
The effect of increased penalties on
standards of proof was considered in reference
to anti-trust legislation in 1990. That study
considered the impact of Congress' increasing
penalties for anti-trust violations from the
misdemeanor to the felony level. An analysis
was conducted of pre and post legislation cases.
The findings indicated that in addition to the
deterrent effect that Congress intended, there
were other factors that reduced the number of
prosecutions. One was the more vigorous
defenses mounted by the accused.
The other was in the form of unfavorable
changes in conviction rules in the form of
increased standard of proof (Snyder, 1990).
Since the existing standard of proof is so
subjective and low, it is entirely likely that the
EFCA provision would meet the same result and
induce a requisite higher burden of proof. The
increased penalties add to the gravity of the
situation, so the courts respond to a perceived
obligation to be more diligent in their findings.
That study suggests that “...more attention
should be focused on how higher penalties affect
other dimensions of individual behavior and the
enforcement process (id.).” Additional resources
may have to be diverted to investigation.
Ordinarily, this would be expected to result in
more delay in the organization and first contract
processes. This is not the case as the EFCA's
authors’ added language to mitigate the impact
of any delay as a result of this by providing for
injunctions.

Injunctions
The penalty section of the EFCA allows for
injunctive relief for cases of employer
interference with organizing and first contract
bargaining. This is not the case under the
existing legislation. Under the existing
legislation, Section 10(l) allows for the NLRB to
petition the local federal District court for
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injunctive relief for certain employee unfair
labor practices. These include secondary
boycotts (A secondary boycott is an attempt by
labor to convince others to stop doing business
with a particular firm because that firm does
business with another firm that is the subject of a
strike and/or a primary boycott) and hot cargo
agreements (an agreement between labor and an
employer barring the employer from using or
otherwise dealing with the products of another
employer whose employees are nonunion).
This is a change that labor proponents have
been advocating for years (Bronfenbrenner,
1994). Again, this legislation is designed to get
the worker back to work, and eliminate delay
from the process.
Employers would likely be concerned with
how these injunctions would impact them when
they attempt to terminate problem and/or
disruptive employees. In considering this, it is
important to remember that EFCA only applies
this injunctive relief to employees during the
organization and first contract process. If those
processes are not underway when the allegation
is made, an injunction is not available. However,
it would likely be the case that during those
processes, employees who do not qualify for this
injunctive relief will assert a right to it. The
resulting
consequence
would
be
the
inconvenience of an employer having to justify
the dismissal as a performance issue and not anti
union activity. Further, the employer would have
to defend against a false allegation of an unfair
labor practice. This is another example of the
authors of the EFCA crafting the legislation to
strengthen the employees’ ability to organize to
the possible detriment of the employer. The
overriding principle of disproportionately
favoring the employees in an effort to level the
playing field.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Representative Miller, the EFCA's sponsor,
has made statements clearly indicating a belief
that not only are workers better served by being
in unions, but also that allowing workers to join
unions will revitalize the US economy. “The
EFCA will help rebuild our nations' middle class
and make our economy work for everyone
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again.” “In order have a fair sustainable
economic recovery; workers have to be able to
bargain for decent wages and benefits (Rep.
Miller, 2009).” Consequently, Rep. Miller has
equated this legislation to a necessary tool for
producing a recovery from the current poor
economic condition in the US. Similarly,
Senator Edward Kennedy, a cosponsor who
introduced EFCA to the senate indicates, “It's a
critical step toward putting the economy back on
track... (Sen. Kennedy, 2009).” The implication
is that workers, particularly those in the middle
class, need to be in unions, to secure better
compensation, and consequently cause a US
economic recovery. Based on this it becomes
difficult to conceptualize the impact of the
EFCA without at least exploring the debate
about the large scale economic benefits of
unionization. Clearly, Rep. Miller indicates that
middle class workers are better served by being
in unions, and he and Senator Kennedy believe
that this is a necessary component of a US
economic recovery.
It is clearly indicated through the statistical
reference of the Department of Labor's Bureau
of Labor Statistics that, on average, workers in
unions are compensated at higher rates than
those who are not unionized. In addition to this,
it is consistently cited that workers in unions are
more likely to have health insurance (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2009).
Initially, when the Employee Free Choice
Act was proposed in 2007, the impetus was to
make it so that the middle class would be made
better off through corresponding wage increases.
The current economic turmoil of 2009 has
caused the bill's proponents to modify their
position somewhat. It is now presented that the
EFCA will facilitate easier unionization, leading
to increased wages for the middle class,
resulting in an economic recovery as the middle
class will be economically empowered to
facilitate it.

Can the Economic Impact be Predicted?
There is very little information available to
assist with a formation of a theory on what the
large scale economic effect of EFCA will be in
the U.S. One study has been put forward by
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Anne Layne-Farrar, an economist of LECG, a
private consulting group. In her research, she has
studied the effect of the shift to the card check
system from an election system in certain
Canadian provinces. Canada was chosen for the
comparison not only because of the recent shifts
to card check, but also because of “...the
remarkable similarities in industrial structure
and the economic integration between the US
and Canada allow us to use the Canadian
experience as natural experiment for the US
economy (Lane-Farrar, 2009).”
According to the study, An Empirical
Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act:
The Economic Implications, an increase in 1.5
million union members in one year would lead
to the loss of 600,000 jobs by the following
year. Jobs losses directly attributed to the
passage of card check legislation would be equal
to the entire population of Boston or seventyfive percent of San Francisco. Dr. Layne-Farrar
further notes that if Andy Stern’s (National
President of the Service Employees International
Union) prediction were to come true then
"...unemployment is predicted to rise between
5.3 and 6.2 million (Layne-Farrar, 2009).” The
study indicates a basic shift in labor demand. It
presumes that as the cost of an employee
increases due to union induced increased
compensation, the demand for workers at the
higher price will be lower. Consequently, this
decreased demand will manifest itself as
increased unemployment.
EFCA proponents have taken to discrediting
this study. The House Committee on Education
and Labor has indicated that...”This is a bogus
study bankrolled by the very lobbyists pumping
millions into efforts to defeat this bill (EFCA
Myth v. Fact, 2009).” They go on to cite that the
US experienced one of its greatest economic
expansions during the 50's and 60's during the
highest rate of unionization. It is further
indicated that during that time union density was
at a high of approximately 30%, and
unemployment was about 4.5%. Unfortunately,
as previously stated, that United States does not
exist anymore. The cold war has ended, and the
US industrial base that reigned during that
period has all but been completely off-shored.
Additional perspective is gained by keeping in
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mind that that committee is chaired by Rep.
George Miller, the lead sponsor of the EFCA.
There is some evidence as to the effect of
recent unionization on individual employers.
The study in question was an analysis conducted
comparing businesses that became unionized by
narrow margins and those that defeated
unionization by narrow margins (Dinardo &
Leep, 2004). This was done for organization
attempts occurring from 1984 to 2001. Their
analysis indicated that, “that in the last twenty
years, newly formed unions have had very little
effect on firms' “bottom line” (id.).” In the
findings, this lack of impact is attributed to the
diminished power nationally of unions over that
period in the face of employers. However, there
is a shortcoming in the study in reference to
applying it to the potential effect of the EFCA.
Unions have a tendency to target highly
profitable employers who are likely to grow and
pay higher rates of compensation. Consequently,
this study does not translate well to the economy
as a whole that is populated by strong and weak
enterprises.
Consequently, there is no clear, objective
economic analysis of the large scale effect of the
EFCA. The opinions that are presented are
partisan. Also, they assume that the EFCA
would cause a large scale wage increase in the
US. There is no basis for this assumption. Newly
certified unions and employees may be able to
effectively and reasonably bargain and craft
agreements that allow for prosperity. If not,
there is no reason to assume that FMCS
appointed arbitrators will defer to a policy of
increasing wages for employees. Opponents and
proponents of the act together must bear in mind
that financial gains and monetary benefits are
not the best feature of unionization and
collective bargaining agreements.
WORKPLACE STABILITY
If the potential compensation and large scale
economic impacts are set aside, we can consider
what many labor activists consider to be the real
benefits to union organizing and first contracts.
It is not increased wages and compensation. It is
the job security and “basic rights” that make
these agreements a significant victory for
workers (Juravich et. al., 2006). Grievance
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procedures provide for these basic rights and
replace what is referred to as arbitrary employer
control in the workplace (id). It is also by this
mechanism that the employer is forced to
surrender a significant portion of their flexibility
to run an efficient enterprise.
Efficiency does not have to be sacrificed. It
is suggested that how management reacts to the
new agreements can make the determination on
the productivity of the workplace in the post
collective bargaining agreement period. This is
indicated in a study of 6 cement plants that
became organized at different periods from 1953
to 1976 (Clark, 1980). A union productivity
effect was documented. It was the authors
determination that the management in these
locations adjusted to unionization in such a way
that they were able to establish a more
productive workplace in the post collective
bargaining agreement period.
This change in management style is
exhibited in the statement made by one manager
that, before the union, the workplace was run
like a family, now it is run like a business (id.).
This could have many connotations. In this
instance it may have been negative. But from
this statement one can infer that the union
created a condition where management was
force to act in such a way as to take a more
formal stance at the workplace. “The union
wage [increase] creates incentives for
management to extract more work effort from a
given level of employees(id).” The employers
introduced systems of production goals
accompanied by performance review systems.
Additionally, staff meetings were initiated which
were used for communications, training, and
assessment of conditions and progress.
Either way, the situation is likely to become
more stable. This is because if the bargaining
process is referred to mandatory arbitration,
there will likely be grievance arbitration
imposed. The employees will be able to have
their legitimate complaints heard in whatever
forum is laid out in the agreement. This will
undoubtedly have a positive impact on their
morale. In return, the employer automatically
gets a “no strike provision” in the agreement.
The employers would not be able to attempt to
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apply economic pressure, or contest alleged
unfair labor practices by the traditional method
of a strike. As is guaranteed by case law, the
employees would have to submit this issues to
arbitration. A more stable system is the end
result of such an arrangement.
CONCLUSION
The Employee Free Choice Act, by all
accounts, has the capacity to increase the rate of
unionization in the United States. Central to its
ability to do so is the elimination of the delay
that impacts the union organization and
certification processes, as well as the bargaining
of the first contract. The proposed changes in
certification will provide the effect that the
EFCA's authors intend by streamlining the
process. This will facilitate greater success rates,
and encourage greater numbers of organizing
drives. Additionally, the guarantee of a first
contract for all successfully certified unions will
provide for additional incentives for employees
to attempt to organize. The increased deterrents
provided for with the EFCA will help organizers
to operate more efficiently in the organizing
process, as much of the employer induced
coercion will be removed.
Having achieved that, employers and unions
in the United States would have to deal with the
potential unintended consequences of the EFCA.
While the prospect of employer induced threats
and coercion will be mitigated, there will be
increased likelihood of organizers and pro union
employees exerting inappropriate pressure on
their fellow workers to sign authorization cards.
Additionally, there will be reduced options
available to those workers who would refrain
from being associated with a union.
Also, mandatory arbitration of first contracts
could induce a negative impact on the collective
bargaining process in the form of a narcotic
effect. This measure does have some potential to
adversely affect the bargaining process to the
detriment of both unions and employers. The
lack of clear procedural guidelines for the FMCS
to conduct mandatory arbitrations results in
uncertainty as to how well the EFCA will serve
to maintain a stable US workplace. If a tendency
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to favor one side over the other develops,
collective bargaining will be subverted.
Increasing
penalties
for
wrongful
terminations is appropriate, but could have the
impact of requiring a higher burden of proof to
sustain such charges. This would require more
comprehensive and thorough investigations of
such charges. The result could be increased
expense, and charges not being found to have
merit that would have under the existing
legislation.
Finally, the true economic impact of this
legislation cannot be predicted. The assumption
that mass unionization will result in universally
higher wages and by consequence, facilitate
economic recovery are based on supposition and
not supported with facts. It is suggested, and
must be considered that the opposite, negative
economic impact could occur. More analysis of
this potential impact is in order.
That aside, it must be kept in mind that the
biggest gains for employees will come not from
increased compensation, but from increased
rights in the workplace. Through collective
bargaining agreements employees will receive
more stability and security in their employment.
This will be at the cost of employers
surrendering a portion of their management
rights in those same agreements. Whether the
impact on the workplace is positive or negative
depends on how the unions and employers
choose to interact.
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